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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the impacts of the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami at the 
Fukushima  nuclear  power  plant  in  Japan,  which  were  amplified  by  a  failure  of 
coordination across the plant, corporate, industrial, and regulatory levels, resulting in a 
nuclear  catastrophe  comparable  in  cost  to  Chernobyl.  It  derives  generic  lessons  for 
industrial structure and regulatory frame for the electric power industry by identifying the 
two shortcomings of a horizontal coordination mechanism: instability under large shocks 
and the lack of “defense in depth.” The suggested policy response is to harness the power 
of  “open-interface-rule-based  modularity”  by  creating  an  independent  nuclear  safety 
commission and an independent system operator owning the transmission grid module in 
Japan. We propose a transitory price mechanism that can restrain price volatility while 
providing investment incentives.  
Key  words:  horizontal  coordination,  modularity,  nuclear  power,  regional  monopoly, 
electricity regulation, safety regulation, public ownership, independent system operator 
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Three Nuclear Power Plant Crises: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima 
An earthquake of a magnitude of 9.0, the second largest in scientifically observed history, 
and the accompanying tsunami with the surge of more than 12 meters, hit Tohoku, Japan, 
on March 11, 2011. It triggered the immediate shut down of nuclear reactors at the power 
plants owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) at Fukushima (6 Boiling 
Water Reactors, “BWRs”, at Fukushima-Dai-ichi and 4 BWRs at Fukushima-Dai-ni). 
However, hydrogen explosions and fuel core meltdowns at the Dai-ichi reactors occurred 
within a few days because there was no electricity to drive the pumps to cool them. This 
catastrophe has generated still-unknown public costs, symbolized by the emissions of 
cesium 137, equivalent to 168 times of release from the detonation of the atomic bomb at 
Hiroshima, although without the immediate loss of life associated with an atomic blast. 
(Most of the more than 20,000 deaths from the tsunami were from drowning.) 
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  This nuclear catastrophe has not only generated a global public debate regarding 
the  social  costs  and  benefits  of  nuclear  power  generation,  but  also  poses  serious 
engineering and social scientific research questions. In this paper we are concerned with 
the  question  of  whether  the  extent  of  the  accident  at  Fukushima  was  an  inevitable 
consequence  of  a  natural  disaster  beyond  the  “conceivable  hypothetical  possibilities” 
(“soteigai”),  as  TEPCO  claims;  or  whether  there  were  inherent  contradictions  in  the 
structure of Japan’s nuclear power industry that increased the magnitude of the impact. 
Then, we ask how this industry should be restructured to be more robust to extreme 
shocks and to become more innovative? 
  Our  theoretical  framework  is  comparative  so  that  our  treatment  is  not  only 
relevant  to  the  current  Japanese  situation,  but  also  has  relevance  for  public  risk 
management,  for  the  regulation  of  integrated  monopolies,  and  for  innovation  in 
alternative energy sources. To motivate such a comparative approach, we first highlight 
briefly the causes and behavioral responses to the emergencies during three major nuclear 
crises: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima.  
    On March 28, 1979, an equipment malfunction combined with miscommunication 
led  to  the  melting  of  fuel  in  Unit  2,  a  light-water-moderated-and-cooled  Pressurized 
Water Reactor (PWR), of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, which had begun 
commercial operation three months earlier. The reactor was brought under control within 
100  hours  without  a  hydrogen  explosion  or  off-site  contamination.  So  when  U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter visited Three Mile Island on Sunday, April 1, 1979, he was there 
to raise hope for an anxious nation. He was not there to intervene, but as an ex-nuclear 
submarine officer, he wanted to show that there was nothing to fear. The interface rules 
between his function as the U.S. president and the Three Mile Island manager had already 
been promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after its inception 
on January 19, 1975. Jimmy Carter did not involve himself with the decision making at 
Three Mile Island, or in the investigation of its causes or consequences.     
    On April 26, 1986, operators of Chernobyl’s Unit 4, a Graphite-Moderated/Light-
Water-Cooled Reactor (RBMK) operating since March 1984, were testing the reactor’s 
operating limits under low power. However, to conduct the test, some safety systems 
were disabled, and operators mistakenly reduced the power to 1%. At such low power, 
the reactor became unstable, leading to fluctuations in power up to 100 times normal, 
causing a steam explosion that blew off the top of the reactor at 01:23:44 (GMT+2). 
When Mikhail Gorbachev, the last General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1985-1991), broke his 18-day silence, he was the Page 3    15 Oct 2011 
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head of a chain of command that determined on the morning of the accident to forever 
cover  up  information  regarding  the  damages.  This  cover  up  has  continued  with  all 
countries of the Former Soviet Union with no accounting of the health of the 500,000 
Soviet  Army  Reservists  who  shoveled  chunks  of  highly  radioactive  graphite  off  the 
Chernobyl site, or the residents of Chernobyl who spent April 26, 1986, absorbing that 
morning’s explosive radioactive release. 
In contrast to the previous two cases, the crisis at Fukushima, Japan, was triggered 
by natural disasters. On March 11
th, following a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, TEPCO’s 
Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) in Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 began their 
systematic shutdowns (Units 5 and 6 were already shutdown for refueling). In shutdown 
mode, cooling water should have reduced the reactors’ remaining decay heat. However, it 
soon  became  clear  that  not  only  was  electric  power  from  the  transmission  grid 
unavailable because of earthquake damage, but also that the plant’s back-up generators 
had failed during the tsunami. Further, personnel at all levels were forced to take care of 
the personal consequences of the natural disasters, as well as the nuclear consequences. 
The imminent question was, “Who had the ultimate authority and responsibility to 
make decisions these critical moments?” Prime Minister Naoto Kan inspected TEPCO’s 
ten BWRs at both Fukushima sites (Dai-ichi and Dai-ni) with the plant manager, Mr. 
Masao Yoshida, giving him his first hands-on experience with nuclear power. (The Prime 
Minister had come to distrust TEPCO through his career experience in civic movements 
and because TEPCO had been caught lying about the quality of Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 
1’s  containment  in  2002.)  Two  top  managers,  Chairman  Katsumata  and  President 
Shimizu, were both out of Tokyo and away from TEPCO headquarters for more than 20 
hours after the earthquake. Between various stakeholders, including the Prime Minister 
and his advisors, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA, see Figure 1), TEPCO 
headquarters,  and  Fukushima,  there  were  continuous  verbal  exchanges,  continuous 
mutual  guessing  of  each  others’  intentions,  and  continuous  hesitations  to  disclose 
unfavorable  information  or  take  decisive  action;  a  situation  that  Kan  described  as  a 
“language game” after his resignation as Prime Minister. During this period of indecision, 
fuel melted in Unit 1 (March 11
th, 19:30), hydrogen exploded in Unit 1 (March 12
th, 
15:36), fuel melted in Unit 3 (March 13
th, 09:00), and fuel melted in Unit 2 (March 14
th, 
20:50); see NEA (2011) and Wikipedia (2011) for chronologies. 
On March 15
th, during a meeting starting at 05:30, involving the Prime Minister, 
his staff, and TEPCO officials, dual hydrogen explosions damaged the roof of Unit 2 
(06:10) and in the reactor building of Unit 4 (06:14). It is unclear what TEPCO officials Page 4    15 Oct 2011 
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might have known about the state of their melted reactors at the start of the meeting, but 
with televised explosions during the meeting, the Prime Minister became furious and sent 
the Minister of METI to TEPCO’s headquarters to co-chair the committee supervising 
crisis  management  with  TEPCO’s  President.  While  information  sharing  among 
stakeholders improved after the meeting on March 15
th, the usual method of making 
decisions in Japan failed in March 2011, and the Prime Minister resigned in September 
2011  under  the  mounting  public  criticism  of  his  failure  to  effectively  mobilize  and 
coordinate available resources to respond and contain the impacts of the disaster.
2 
Figure 1: Japan’s Nuclear Industrial Complex Organizational Chart 
 
Source: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CNPP2011_CD/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan2011.htm 
                                                 
2. What happened at the Fukushima nuclear plants during the earthquake and tsunami, as well as 
the ensuing human errors, are being examined by the “Investigation Committee on the Accident 
at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations” appointed by the Kan government. The committee is 
headed  by  a  university  professor  specialized  in  crisis  management, a n d  its  members  include 
lawyers, engineers, geologists, and other specialists, who do not have any financial interest in the 
industry or positions in the government.  Page 5    15 Oct 2011 
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Three Prototypical Organization Architectures 
These three episodes may be regarded as unique events in extraordinary circumstances, 
but each of them is indicative of a particular built-in information architecture in and 
around the respective nuclear power plants, and the associated mode of response to an 
extraordinary event. To understand their distinct features, imagine a system composed of 
many  units  designed  for  specific  tasks  or  functions w i t h   distinct  modes  of 
interconnectedness among them. We can identify three modes of system architecture: (1) 
the “open interface-rule-based modular” mode, (2) the “top-down” or “vertical control” 
mode, and (3) the “horizontal coordination” mode.  
In its generic form, the first, modular mode is a system composed of units; each 
specialized in a particular function and connected through ex ante agreed upon interface 
rules. As long as it is following the rules, each unit can “encapsulate” its own function 
without intervention by other units. The information systemic properties of this mode 
have been theoretically analyzed by Cremer (1990) and Aoki (2001, Ch. 4), and applied 
to  an  interpretation  of  the  post-IBM  industrial  organization  of  the  information  and 
communications industry by Baldwin and Clark (2000). The idea of modularity can be 
applied to various levels: the engineering design of a plant, organizational architecture, 
and industrial organization. At the level of nuclear power plant design, a pressurized 
water reactor (PWR) can be considered as a set of equipment modules inserted into a 
nuclear-grade  concrete  structure.  These  modules  are  (1)  the  reactor,  (2)  the  steam 
generator,  (3)  the  turbine-generator-condenser,  (4)  the  transformer  and  electrical 
equipment,  and  (5)  the  cooling  and  plumbing  systems.  In  recent  designs  of  Small 
Modular Reactors, based on naval reactors, the reactor and steam generator are being 
integrated into a single module, which can be installed in increments (45-200 MWe) to 
more closely match local demand conditions, see Rothwell (2011). 
 One of the known advantages of the modular mode is its ability to self-organize 
innovation. Baldwin and Clark (2000) explain how multiple modules pursuing the same 
function can lead to the selection of the best performing module through evolutionary 
competition. In environments where uncertainty is very high, a mechanism allowing for 
duplication,  substitution,  splitting,  and  the  addition  of  modules  according  to  open 
interface rules can create higher option values in spite of the costs of duplication. It is 
analogous to the gains from multiple experiments when possible experimental outcomes 
are  highly  uncertain.  An  analogy  to  this  is  the  defense-in-depth  in  the  design  of  the 
nuclear plants where multiple backup devices to correct engineering failures are built into 
the structure, and their operation are successively triggered according to ex ante design Page 6    15 Oct 2011 
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rules. Below, we apply the concept of modularity at the firm and industrial levels, and 
discuss its importance to the safety and efficiency of nuclear power generation.  
The second, the “vertical control mode,” is the one most familiar to economists and 
organizational theorists. It is conceptualized as a system in which constituent units are 
arranged in a tree structure, and (command and report) information flows only along 
vertical lines, and rarely across horizontal levels. It is known that such a mode performs 
relatively well when there is a low degree of uncertainty because scarce information 
processing capacities are held at the top of the chain of command. However, as can be 
seen  after  the  Chernobyl  explosion,  rigorous  applications  of  this  mode  may  not  be 
conducive to dealing with a crisis when speedy use of on-site information is critical.  
The third, the “horizontal coordination mode,” at the most generic level is one in 
which  information  about  evolving  environments  is  shared  among  constituent  units 
engaged in complementary functions, and decisions on respective outputs are continually 
adjusted/negotiated among them. The theoretical properties of such mechanisms have 
been  analytically  studied  by  Aoki  (1986),  Cremer  (1990),  Alonso,  Dessein,  and 
Matouschek (2008), and others. It is known to perform better than the vertical control 
mode if the environment changes continually, but not drastically, and if functions of 
modules are technologically complementary. Aoki (1990) wrote (emphasis added), “On 
the  other  hand,  if  environments  are  extremely  volatile  or  uncertain,  [horizontal 
coordination  mode]  adaptation  to  environmental  changes  may  yield  highly  unstable 
results.” 
Rothwell  (1996)  empirically  tested  the  relative  performance  of  the  horizontal 
coordination versus vertical control at the level of nuclear plant and found that the hazard 
rate of outage is lower for the former. Because plants are running a higher percentage of 
the total time, the horizontal mode is generally superior in the absence of crisis. Rothwell 
analyzes data on operation and outages from 49 nuclear power plants (with most of the 
nuclear  power  units  in  the  U.S.)  between  January  1976  and  December  1985,  and 
constructs an index of hierarchy based on nuclear power plant organization charts in 
Olson et al. (1984) from the Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) required by the U.S. 
NRC.  Rothwell e s timated  parameters  that  support  the  proposition  that  the  horizontal 
mode is associated with longer periods of operation and that the vertical control mode is 
associated with shorter periods of outage. Page 7    15 Oct 2011 
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The 3-’11 Failure of the Japanese Horizontal Coordination Mode at Fukushima 
TEPCO is a regional integrated monopoly that supplied 29% of total power supply of 
Japan in 2010 to twenty-four million households and more than two million businesses in 
the  Tokyo  metropolitan  area.  They  own  17  nuclear  power  units  at  Fukushima  and 
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, thermal plants, and transmission and distribution grids. There was 
“seamless” horizontal coordination among various power generating plants, transmission, 
and distribution systems to meet electric power demand under regulated pricing. As a 
consequence, TEPCO boasted of its “quality of power supply,” i.e., the extremely low 
probability  of  power  outage  in  response  to  seasonally  fluctuating  demand.  However, 
inside  the  integrated  system,  we  find  that  the  lengths  of  voluntary  and  involuntary 
outages at TEPCO’s nuclear power plants have been high, for example, following the 
earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in July 16, 2007, which damaged the plant in ways 
extremely similar to the earthquake damages at Fukushima on March 11
th.
3 This suggests 
the existence of ample capacity slack to sustain the claimed quality of supply. Dozens of 
nuclear  power  units  were  shut  down  subsequent  to  the  March  11
th  crisis  due  to 
breakdowns, precautionary suspensions of operation, and regular maintenance, cutting 
the capacity of the total power supply of TEPCO by 25%. The expected power shortage 
during the summer of 2011 did not occur, and capacity use barely exceeded 90% (which 
was due to the collective sacrifice of millions of Japanese).  
 In  spite  of  its  apparent  performance  in  the  normal  state  of  affairs,  however, 
aspects of the horizontal coordination mode at the corporate and industrial levels that 
manifested themselves in response to the natural disaster clearly failed to contain its 
impacts to a more reasonable level. The ambiguity in the decision-making locus and the 
failure of continuous-negotiation among stakeholders can be clearly exemplified in the 
decision to cool reactors with seawater. New York Times (2011) published, 
 “On the evening of March 12, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant’s oldest reactor 
had suffered a hydrogen explosion and risked a complete meltdown. Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan asked aides to weigh the risks of injecting seawater into the reactor to cool 
it down. At this crucial moment, it became clear that a prime minister who had built 
                                                 
3. Damages at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, the world’s largest nuclear power plant, included water leaks 
in the reactor buildings; water seal leaks in the reactor core cooling system; oil leaks in the 
reactor core cooling system pumps; oil leaks in the transformer facility; fires in the transformer 
facility; loss of power to and from the transformer facility; water leaks in the backup diesel 
generator facility; loss of power to the liquid waste disposal system; cracks in the cooling water 
intake system; radioactive contaminated water leaks; and uneven liquefaction under the reactor 
site. Only two of the seven units at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa have operated since July 16, 2007. 
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his career on suspicion of the collusive ties between Japan’s industry and bureaucracy 
was  acting  nearly  in  the  dark.  .  .  .  Based  on  a  guess  of  the  mood  at  the  prime 
minister’s  office,  the  company  ordered  the  plant  manager  to  stop  [injecting  sea 
water]. But the manager [Masao Yoshida] did something unthinkable in corporate 
Japan: he disobeyed the order and secretly continued using seawater; a decision that 
experts say almost certainly prevented a more serious meltdown and has made him an 
unlikely hero. . . . Last week, TEPCO gave Mr. Yoshida its lightest punishment of a 
verbal reprimand for defying the order.” 
In responding to unexpected external shocks at nuclear plants, correct and timely 
human actions at the site are “essential.” To make the general definition of human-asset 
essentiality,  due  to  Hart  (1995,  see  also  Aoki  2010,  Ch.  2)  more  specific,  human 
resources at the nuclear plant site are “essential” (or “indispensable”) in the event of a 
sudden, major shock, if the (marginal) effectiveness of top management direction cannot 
be enhanced only with the vertical control of physical assets without complementary 
inputs of local human resources. If this condition holds so that human resources at the top 
management  level  and  plant  level  are  reciprocally  essential,  the  specific  tasks  of 
information processing and decision-making of each level in the event of a sudden shock 
should be made distinct and their interactive mode should be clearly specified ex ante. In 
this way, expertise at both corporate and plant level are best used in coordinating with 
each for coping with a crisis without delay and mutual interventions in others’ expertise. 
This is essentially the power of modularity in a highly complex system subject to high 
uncertainty.  But  this  is  possible,  provided  that  the  top  management  is  capable  of 
designing required interface rules, on the one hand, and essential expertise is available at 
the plant level, one the other. The impact of the March 11
th catastrophe was amplified by 
ad hoc negotiations among multiple stakeholders in the midst of an emergent crisis, some 
of  whom  lacked  professional  knowledge  of  nuclear  engineering  or  valuable  on-site 
information.  
Horizontal coordination may be superior in terms of “just-in-time” coordination in 
the normal state of affairs, but not in terms of “just-in-case” preparation. Would it be 
possible then to implement horizontal coordination (with continual information sharing 
and negotiation among multiple units) in the normal state of affairs, but switch to the 
modular mode of coordination with the emergence of a large shock? This is unlikely, 
because actions of constituent units of corporate organizations are normally taken on the 
basis of their shared beliefs about others’ expectations and actions in the normal state of 
affairs (see Aoki 2010, Ch. 2, on “corporate culture” as a common framework for intra-
corporate games). Such a matrix of expectations is not malleable in response to a sudden 
shock. As chaotic exchanges among the stakeholders after the March 11
th catastrophe, Page 9    15 Oct 2011 
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they tended to behave as they had been in the normal course of events. If so, how can 
aspects of the modular mode of coordination in a crisis situation be incorporated into the 
Japanese power industry in spite of its path-dependent reliance on horizontal coordination 
within the context of an integrated monopoly? It can be done only through a fundamental 
institutional  innovation  made  possible  by  applying  the  principle  of  modularity  in  a 
broader context of industrial organization and regulation.  
Un-bundling the Three Functions of the Integrated Regional Electricity Monopolies 
Modularity  can  be  applied  to  the  Japanese  electric  power  industry  by  splitting  the 
integrated regional monopolies into separate corporate entities based on their functions: 
generation,  transmission,  and  retail  distribution.  More  concretely,  the  Independent 
System Operator (the ISO) who owns the transmission grid may be created as a crucial 
infra-structure, to which potential electric power suppliers, as well as retailers and large 
corporate customers-cum-independent generators, are to be assured equal accesses under 
rules that the ISO sets and implements. To avoid problems like those of the 2000!2001 
California  power  crisis,  as  well  as  to  provide  incentives  for  investments  (possibly, 
including  investments  in  safer  nuclear  plants),  rules  for  the  matching  and  safety 
monitoring needs to be carefully designed and implemented by the ISO with the support 
on information technology, on which we will touch on shortly. We first suggest the way 
how  a  transition  to  such  industrial  restructuring  may  be  possible.
 There  were  some 
discussions within the government and the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Economy 
between  the  late  1990s  and  the  early  2000s  as  regards  the  possibility  of  separating 
generation and transmission. However, it was not materialized by the strong political 
resistance of TEPCO who argued it being detrimental to the “quality supply of power”.  
Now the situation has changed dramatically in the aftermath of the March-11 catastrophe. 
TEPCO  will  certainly  short  of  cash,    in  meeting  all  the  accumulating  Fukushima 
liabilities and the costs of decommissioning the Units 1-4 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi, and 
in the worst case scenario its net assets will become negative. 
4 However,  coping with 
                                                 
4. The “Commission for Investigating the Management and Financial State of TEPCO” set up by 
the Kan administration made public its final Report on October 3, 2011. It estimates the cost of 
decommission  of  Fukushima  reactors  1-4  at  1.081  trillion  yen  and o n e -time  costs  of 
compensation f o r  d a m a g e s  a t  2 . 6 1  t r i l l i o n  yen  in  2011,  followed  by  annual  compensations 
estimated at 1.24 trillion yen for fiscal year 2012 and 0.90 trillion yen thereafter. (The cost of 
decommissioning was estimated by multiplying the cost of decommissioning Three Mile Island 
by 4 units, plus the extra costs associated with decontaminating the cooling water, etc. On the 
cost of decommissioning Three Mile Island, see Pasqualetti and Rothwell, 1991). According to a 
simulation study by its Task Force, the net asset of TEPCO could become negative in 2013 
without the operation of the nuclear plants and an increase of retail tariffs.  The function of this Page 10    15 Oct 2011 
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this situation through formal bankruptcy procedures will be costly in terms of the public 
welfare  associated  with  secure  electric  power  supplies  and  the  stability  of  financial 
markets  (TEPCO  is  one  of  the  largest  corporate  bond  issuers  in  Japan,  with  its 
outstanding long-term debt of 11.3 trillion yen against its net value of 1.6 trillion yen as 
of March 31, 2011). Thus, an infusion of public funds into TEPCO is inevitable, for 
which  purpose  the  “Nuclear  Damage  Support  Organization”  was  established  in 
September 2011. It is expected that this organization may expend as much as 5 trillion 
yen.  
However, public expenditure on TEPCO need not, and should not, be made to bail 
TEPCO  out  of  its  potential  insolvency  with  its  corporate  form  intact.  The  Japanese 
government  could  purchase  (a  part  of)  TEPCO’s  transmission  grid,  and  place  their 
ownership and operations in a new corporate entity acting as an Independent System 
Operator (ISO).
5 As in many European countries, Japan could create a publicly-owed, 
equal-access transmission system. Public-ownership is based primarily on the experience 
in  electricity  deregulation  that  the  transmission  grid  is  a  natural  monopoly,  unlike 
generation.  See  Rothwell  and  Gomez  (2003).  Generators  of  varied  types  (possibly 
including existing nuclear plants which will have passed stress tests), as well as regional 
retail suppliers, may also be independently incorporated. Supplies and demands may be 
matched  through  the  spot  market  operated  by  the  ISO.  However,  in  order  to  avoid 
problems like those of the 2000!2001 California power crisis, and to provide incentives 
for  investment  in  power  generating  assets,  spot  markets  can  be  augmented  with  the 
following three measures.  First, retail distributors and large consumers can be engaged in 
long-term fixed-cost contracts with supplies to restrain the potential exercise of “short-
term” market power by suppliers. In the power industry, suppliers may be able to create 
monopoly power by creating artificial shortages of supply by deliberately shutting own 
their  plants  for  unscheduled  maintenance,  if  only  the  spot  markets  are  to  be  used 
(Bornstein 2002; Wolak 2003b).
6 
                                                                                                                                                
Commission  was  absorbed  into  the  “Nuclear  Damage  Support  Organization,”  chartered i n  
September 2011.  
5 TEPCO is one of nine regional monopolies in Japan. An ISO may be first created within the 
domain of TEPCO and, contingent on its success, other regions may follow the suit.  
6. One of the important factors of the 2000-2001 California electricity crisis was the creation of 
an a r t i f i c i a l  s h o r t  s u p p l y , e n g i n e e r e d  primarily  by  Enron b e f o r e  i t  d e c l a r e d  b a n k r u p t c y  i n  
September  2001, t o  a g g r a v a t e  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  a s h o r t a g e  o f  h y d r o e l e c t r i c i t y  f r o m  t h e  P a c i f i c  
Northwest due to draught. This caused an 800% price spike in wholesale electricity prices in 
2000. See Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro (2000). Simultaneously, a cap was imposed on retail 
electricity  tariffs.  As  a  result,  huge  losses  were  incurred  by  the  three  regional  electricity 
monopolists in the wholesale market, operated by the California Independent System Operator, Page 11    15 Oct 2011 
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  Second, on the consumer side, consumers can contract for power supply for a 
specified quantity limit under a fixed price, and pay a current spot market price (e.g., a 
day ahead price) beyond the limit, while rolling over unused quantities, as in cell phone 
service (Bushnell, Hobbs, and Wolak 2009). Such dynamic pricing mechanisms can be 
supported  with  the  introduction  of  Internet-friendly  smart  meters.  It  will  certainly 
motivate  consumers’  behavior  to  respond  to  changing  supply  conditions.  Under  the 
present  situation,  TEPCO  is  obligated  to  meet  forthcoming  demand  under  regulated 
prices to consumers, being forced to maintain a extra productive capacity to avoid black 
outs. 
These contractual measures on the supply and demand sides determine an initial 
position of each player in the market, because consumers in long position can release a 
part of contractual quantities at spot markets, while supplies in long positions have some 
commitments.  Third,  given  these  positions,  competition  in  electricity  supply  can  be 
accomplished  by  first  introducing  “cost-based  dispatch”  (Wolak,  2003a).  In  a  market 
with cost-based dispatch modular generating companies submit their start-up, no-load, 
and variable costs, or supply schedules contingent on spot market prices, to the ISO. The 
ISO then requests power per hour from the generating companies’ assets in order to 
minimize total cost and maximize reliability in meeting electricity demand. The ISO thus 
facilitates  the  way  to  trade  energy  in  the  spot  market  based  on  marginal  cost  of 
generators.  Consequently  generators  compete  based  on  their  cost  of  production.  The 
clearing price in the spot market is equal to the cost of production of the last generating 
unit dispatched. For an application of cost-based dispatch in Latin America, see Falconett 
and  Nagasaka  (2009).  Given  the  present  state  of  information  and  communication 
technology, the operation of such smart grids ought to be feasible in Japan. 
Further, a disintegrated, modular structure can be innovation and environment 
friendly. With an electric/information transmission system as an infrastructure of natural 
monopoly,  various  power  generators,  including  nuclear,  thermal,  hydro,  solar,  wind, 
geothermal, and other renewables, can be connected as mutually autonomous modules 
(i.e., as independent corporate entities) and compete for investor attention on a level-
playing  field.  The  system  as  a  whole  can  then  self-organize  its  innovation  through 
evolutionary selection from among those modules rather than through ex ante planning 
by  a  corporate  headquarters.  As  Baldwin  and  Clark  (2000)  argued,  such  modular 
competition  in  innovation  can  create  option  values  not  possible  under  a  hierarchical 
                                                                                                                                                
and one of them, Pacific Gas & Electric, owner and operator of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power 
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corporate control of innovation. Further, modular competition has favorable incentive 
impacts on each module not available under the integrated corporate system, because the 
extra innovative effort increases the marginal probability of finding the best technology 
(Aoki and Takizawa, 2002). Readers can observe the remarkable speed of innovation in 
the information and communications industries, as well as in the pharmaceutical industry, 
in the last several decades has largely owed to the development of modular industrial 
organizations  (e.g.,  Powell  et  al.,  2005).  By  competitively  linking  suppliers  and 
customers  through  a  Japanese  electric/information  transmission  system  there  will  be 
high-powered incentives for energy conservation, on the one hand, and the development 
of alternative energy sources and power storage, on the other. Various firms outside the 
traditional electric power sector may become active players, e.g., members of industries 
in information technology, plug-in automobile, architectural design and construction, and 
new  generations  of  batteries  and  electric  equipment  manufacturers.  The  definition  of 
Schumpeterian innovation is “creative destruction and recombination.” Unbundling the 
integrated  Japanese  electricity  generation,  transmission,  and  distribution  system  of 
private, regional monopolies, and re-combining human and physical resources in these 
modules  into  a  system  of s e l f -regulating  markets  with  an  electric/information 
transmission system would be institutional innovation in this sense. 
  From  this  perspective,  one  may  say  that  the  public  debate  regarding  nuclear 
energy in Japan in the framework of an all or nothing choice is misplaced, because there 
could  be  also  a  middle  way  to  apply  the  power  of  modularity  for  more  effective 
monitoring of nuclear energy generation and development. A group of nuclear energy 
plants (or groups of thermal plants) can be modularized as autonomous corporate entities 
that internalize highly-qualified human resources, subject to transparent rules stipulated 
by an autonomous regulatory agency. The modular system is thus conducive to shock-
resistance, operational efficiency, and innovation at the plant, corporate, and industrial 
levels,  with  possible  complementarities  among  them.  However,  potential  benefits  of 
modularity will not be realized unless it is applied to the regulatory level as well.  
  In the current Japanese scheme of integrated regional monopolies, nuclear plants 
are placed under a two-tier control by corporate managers and regulators. The TEPCO 
CEO  has  never  been  anyone  having  primary  expertise  in  nuclear  engineering,  but 
someone  skilled  in  government  relations  or  business  negotiations.  TEPCO  exercised 
enormous  market  power  not  only  as  a  regulated  monopoly  in  the  supply  of  electric 
power,  but  also  in  terms  of  enormous  purchases  in  wide-ranging  markets,  such  as 
industrial equipment, fuel, financial services, real estate, and advertising. They are able to Page 13    15 Oct 2011 
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shift cost burdens to regulated tariffs, resulting in electric power prices in Japan that are 
50%  higher  than  in  the  U.S.  and  South  Korea.  The  primary  concern  of  the  top 
management of TEPCO has been to secure its position as a regional monopolist, and 
accumulate monopoly profits. On the other hand, the government safety regulator, the 
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), is a division of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI), which promotes nuclear energy development; see Figure 1. 
NISA  cannot  autonomously  monitor  the  safety  of  nuclear  power  generation  and 
encourage nuclear energy development. There has been implicit and explicit collusion 
between the regulator and the regulated, entrenching both in a self-promoting “nuclear-
industrial complex,” as portrayed in Figure 1. 
  We have suggested that one important factor to control the crisis risk at nuclear 
plants is to prepare a defense-in-depth, that is, to install modular devices ex ante from 
among which one can be successively mobilized after another fails. One of human factors 
that aggravated the impact of the natural disaster was the failure of this precautionary 
mechanism, as symbolized by the failure of a back up generator installed close to the sea 
level in spite of the possible risk of tsunami. Subsequent to the March 11th catastrophe, 
TEPCO insisted that the magnitude of the tsunami had been beyond any hypothetical 
possibility (“souteigai”). However, warnings of possible disaster of that magnitude have 
been  published.  A  historical  document,  Nihon  Sandai  Jitsuroku  (Japan’s  Three 
Emperors’ Historical Records), compiled in 901, recorded a tsunami disaster of similar 
magnitude  in  Tohoku  in  895,  known  now  as  the  “Jyokan-Sanriku”  earthquake.  (It 
documented  that  the  number  of  deaths  from  this  disaster  was  more  than  1,000;  the 
population of Japan around the year 1000 was not more than 7 million.) This and other 
historical data were dismissed by the Japanese government and industry officials as an 
exaggeration typical of historical narratives. Recent geo-physical research confirmed that 
tsunamis  caused  by  earthquakes  greater  than  magnitude  8.0  took  place  six  times  in 
Tohoku during the last 6,000 years.  
  On  the  basis  of  such  historical  and  scientific  research,  concerns  over  the 
inadequacy of defense against a tsunami were expressed by a scientist at official meetings 
at METI that discussed the safety regulation of Fukushima nuclear plants (sogo shigen 
enerughi chosakai, in June and July 2009). The warning was not effectively reflected in 
TEPCO’s  interim  report.  According  to  a  recent  finding  of  the  Japanese  government-
appointed committee for investigating the cause of the disaster, TEPCO did a simulation 
study of the possible impacts of tsunamis with 10-15 meter surges on the Fukushima Page 14    15 Oct 2011 
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plant, and reported its results to NISA five days before the March 11th catastrophe. This 
report and its implications for TEPCO’s credibility have not yet been made public. 
  The defect of placing the regulatory agency under the umbrella of the METI has 
become generally accepted in Japan after the crisis. The government’s proposal (to be 
discussed in the Diet in late 2011) stipulates that a new regulatory agency would be 
placed under the Ministry of Environmental Protection, absorbing the functions of NISA 
and some of those in MEXT (see Figure 1). However, it is still problematic to place a 
regulatory agency under a government ministry, in which the head of the agency reports 
to a minister. This is so because the safety regulator’s decisions could be influenced by 
interest-group  politics,  but  also  because  it  would  be  difficult  to  recruit  professional 
regulators versed in nuclear engineering under the closed personnel rules and practices of 
the  Japanese  administration.  Japan  needs  a  truly  independent  regulatory  commission 
without pressure of interest groups, including TEPCO. Without such modularization of 
regulatory function, safe, reliable nuclear energy development in Japan will be nearly 
impossible. 
Summary: Two Major Factors 
We have described some of the basic human factors that exacerbated the March 11
th 
natural  disaster  at  TEPCO’s  Fukushima  nuclear  power  plant,  transforming  it  into  a 
catastrophe. There were two major factors: one is the delay of action, such as the opening 
of vents to release pressure in the reactors to prevent hydrogen explosions, and another is 
the  failure  of  the  reactor  cooling  systems,  leading  to  reactor  nuclear  fuel  melting. 
Confused and unstructured information exchanges and negotiations among the various 
stakeholders, lacking professional knowledge, on-site information, and clear decision-
making authority, were responsible for the former. The latter was caused by mistakes in 
the risk assessment of possible natural disasters and the consequential failure of defense-
in-depth  against  a  massive  tsunami.  For  this,  the  compromise  of  public  safety  to 
maximize  profit  by  the  regional  monopoly  entrenched  within  the  Japanese  nuclear 
industrial complex was ultimately responsible.  
  The  essence  of  these  problems  can  be  said  to  stem  from  an  aspect  of  the 
coordination  mechanism  inherent  in  the  Japanese  industrial  organization,  that  is,  the 
horizontal  coordination  mode.  In  this  mechanism,  stakeholders  or  constituent  system 
units,  either  at  the  plant,  corporate,  industrial,  or  regulatory  level,  tend  to  share 
information  relevant  to  their  complementary  stakes  and  be  engaged  in  continual 
negotiations over them. Such a mechanism may function relatively smoothly and well by Page 15    15 Oct 2011 
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fine-tuning  reaction  to  continually  and  mildly  changing  environments.  However,  as 
theoretical  analysis  has  made  clearer,  and  events  such  as  the  Fukushima  catastrophe 
empirically revealed, the horizontal coordination mode may fail in the event of a sudden, 
major shock. An aspect of an alternative coordinate mode may be referred to as the 
modular mode. In this, modules specialized in specific functions may be interconnected 
under  ex ante  designed  inter-face  rules.  We  discuss  reasons  why  such  a  mode  may 
perform better in terms of (1) defense-in-depth, (2) response to sudden, massive local 
shocks, (3) efficient industrial organization in the network industries of electric power 
and information technology, and (4) self-organization of innovation.  
  We question whether the Japan power industry can be reformed in a direction 
incorporating  some  aspects  of  the  modular  mode  into  its  traditional  horizontal 
coordination  mode.  We  argue  that  a  solution  to  the  financial  difficulties  of  TEPCO 
caused by the natural accidents and human errors is to introduce modularity in the electric 
power  industry,  beginning  with  the  TEPCO’s  sale  of  its  transmission  assets  to  the 
Japanese government. The natural monopoly of transmission grids in public ownership 
can  serve  as  an  infrastructure  for  introducing  and  developing  aspects  of  the  modular 
mode  of  industrial  organization  to  make  the  Japanese  power  industry  safer,  more 
efficient, more innovative, and more environmentally friendly. In conjunction with such 
industrial reform, the regulatory mechanism should be reframed by making the regulatory 
agency truly independent and professional. This is another application of modularity, in 
this case at the level of public policy.  
Three Unanswered Questions 
We have relied on publicly disclosed information in developing our analysis. However, 
there  remain  some  important  unanswered  questions  at  Fukushima  that  have  not  been 
made  fully  transparent,  but  may  have  significant  implications  for  public  welfare. 
Although they may appear to be technical, we list some of them here to motivate further 
inquiry.  
First, how much damage is there to the reactor pressure vessels of Units 1, 2, and 
3? When Representative Edward Markey (Democrat-Massachusetts) told the public what 
the U.S. NRC had suspected, i.e., that molten fuel might have melted through the reactor 
pressure vessels, the U.S. NRC retracted its suspicion. However, on May 17
th, TEPCO 
confirmed that molten fuel (at 2,800° C) had probably caused stress fractures in the lower 
head of the reactor pressure vessel in Unit 1, and on June 7
th, the Japanese government 
began an inquiry to determine if there had been any molten fuel “melting through” the Page 16    15 Oct 2011 
aoki@stanford.edu    rothwell@stanford.edu       
reactor  pressure  vessels.  Can  the  melted  fuel  and  control  rods  be  extracted  from  the 
reactor vessels? What does this imply for the cost escalation of the 1,871,000,000,000 
yen  (see  footnote  4)  to  decontaminate,  decommission,  dismantle,  and  dispose  of 
Fukushima Dai-ichi, Units 1-4? 
Second,  another  puzzling  question  concerns  “recriticality.”  Criticality  would 
occur if the molten fuel could have generated a self-sustaining nuclear fission reaction. 
This would be classified as a “criticality accident,” such as the one at the Tokai-mura fast 
reactor fuel fabrication facility on September 30, 1999, where a self-sustaining chain 
reaction with a sufficiently high level of reactivity in a specific geometry lasted about 20 
hours  (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf37.html).  On  March  12th,  Prime  Minister 
Kan asked Prof. Madarame, chief commissioner of the Nuclear Safety Commission, see 
Figure 1 (and former professor of the University of Tokyo), whether injecting seawater 
could cause a criticality accident, and the professor’s response was that the chances of 
such a thing happening were “non-zero” (New York Times, 2011). On May 2
nd, Prof. 
Tetsuo  Matsui  of  the  University  of  Tokyo  using  seawater  samples  concluded  that  a 
criticality accident might have occurred 10-15 days after March 11
th, i.e., between March 
21
st and March 26
th; see Matsui (2011).  Have there been any criticality accidents at 
Fukushima? If so, how much radiation was released and who was exposed? How might 
compensation for this exposure increase the present value of the one-time and annual 
costs of compensation?  
Third, there is the issue of finding plutonium in samples outside the plant on 
March 21
st and 22
nd, which were not reported until March 28
th. On March 28
th, TEPCO 
concluded  that  the  levels  of  plutonium  were  not  greater  than  background  levels  of 
plutonium,  from,  for  example,  Hiroshima,  Nagasaki,  and  the  atmospheric  testing  of 
atomic and hydrogen weapons during the 1950s in the Pacific. TEPCO has not discussed 
the  status  of  Unit  3’s  molten  Mixed  Plutonium+Uranium  Oxide  fuel  (MOX,  on  the 
economics of MOX, see Rothwell and Wood, 2011), which could contain up to 10% 
plutonium (the active ingredient in the Nagasaki bomb, produced at the Hanford Atomic 
Reservation, Richland, Washington). Mixed Plutonium+Uranium Oxide fuel had been 
loaded into Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 in August 2010: 
 “In plutonium-thermal ("plu-thermal") power generation, plutonium is removed from 
spent fuel and mixed with uranium to produce MOX (Mixed oxide composed of 
uranium and plutonium) fuels for use in existing nuclear power plants. This effective 
utilization  of  limited  uranium  resources  is  expected  to  contribute  significantly  to 
securing  stable  energy  supply  in  the  future.  To  promote  the  introduction  of 
plutonium-thermal power generation, electric power companies in Japan are making Page 17    15 Oct 2011 
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various  efforts  to  obtain  broad  public  acceptance  of  this  new  power  generation 
method. At TEPCO, we have loaded MOX fuel into Unit 3 at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station in August 2010, and are steadily working our way toward the 
implementation  of  plutonium-thermal  power  generation.”  (emphasis  added) 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/challenge/csr/nuclear/cycle-e.html 
On October 2
nd, abnormally high levels of plutonium were found 40 kilometers from 
Fukushima. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111001002464.htm  
How  much  plutonium  was  released  from  Unit  3?  How  much  plutonium  was 
released from Fukushima Dai-ichi? How might the molten MOX increase the cost of 
decommissioning, given plutonium-239’s 24,100 year half-life (compared to a 8 day half-
life for radioiodine-131 or a 30 year half-life for cesium-137; it takes 30 years for half of 
the cesium to decay, implying that after 300 years only 0.1% of the cesium remains, 
whereas  after  300  years,  99%  of  the  plutonium  remains)?  Will  Mixed 
Plutonium+Uranium Oxide fuel be loaded into other TEPCO reactors or into any other 
Japanese reactors? If not, will the reprocessing and Mixed Plutonium+Uranium Oxide 
fabrication  plant  at  Rokkashomura  ever  be  completed?  If  so,  will  it  ever  be  cost 
competitive with international leased enriched uranium oxide fuel, as proposed by U.S. 
Department of Energy Deputy Secretary Poneman at the International Framework for 
Nuclear  Energy  Cooperation  Executive  Committee  meeting  in  Warsaw,  Poland,  on 
September 28, 2011? http://poland.usembassy.gov/poneman.html Page 18    15 Oct 2011 
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